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Abstract
Cultural heritage has always been at risk during times of war. UNESCO first endeavored to address
the issue shortly after World War II, in 1954, when it passed the first of three signature conventions
to protect against the damage, destruction, and pillage of cultural property in times of armed
conflict. Lacunae and other deficiencies in their frameworks, however, rendered these conventions
difficult to enforce and largely ineffectual. This study offers an assessment of the strengths and
limitations of the UNESCO system of cultural-heritage protection, with a particular focus on the
1954 Hague Convention. It is argued that, by superseding certain key liabilities therein, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague
Convention, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) proved particularly
influential in shaping more effective legal frameworks for protecting cultural heritage, as reflected
in subsequent measures taken by UNESCO, the ICC, and the Security Council. The question of
whether and to what extent the imperative to protect cultural heritage has achieved broad normative
status is likewise evaluated. The study concludes with a brief assessment of recent cultural crimes
in Iraq, Mali, and Syria, followed by a consideration of possible new frameworks for protecting
cultural heritage that seek to improve on the limitations of existing systems and respond to the
unique risks that currently imperil culture in conflict zones.

ii

I. Introduction
Cultural heritage has always been at risk during times of war. Indeed, as historian Richard J. Evans
asserts, “The history of wartime plunder goes back to Jason and the Argonauts looting the Golden
Fleece.”1 Though glib, Evans’s comment speaks to a collection of practices that, since the wars of
the ancients, have posed a threat to cultural heritage, a term used here to refer to historic
monuments, architectural structures, works of art both large and small, and other objects of cultural
significance. (The term cultural property is used largely analogously.)2 These practices include
damage and outright destruction, whether collaterally in active combat or deliberately in targeted
attacks, as well as looting and trafficking. Risks to cultural heritage are particularly acute in conflict
zones, whether an active theater of war like present-day Syria or a place of sustained violence and
instability, such as Mali in 2012–13, when armed insurgents seized control of large tracts of the
north. The term armed conflict may apply to conflicts of either an international or a noninternational character. Increasingly, the belligerents who engage in armed conflict and make
targets of cultural property are nonstate actors (NSAs) such as Islamist militants, although state
actors have proven equally capable of such conduct.
Cultural losses can have an adverse impact on both local populations and our broader
human civilization. The significance of the issue is threefold. At its most fundamental, the
destruction and theft of cultural property represents a material loss of objects of value, thus depriving
states, peoples, and individuals of resources that comprise part of their wealth. Seventy-five years
after World War II, ongoing efforts to restitute artworks stolen by the Nazis to their original Jewish
owners attest to the enduring ramifications of this crime. Material losses are compounded when they
happen at a large scale, as was the case with the National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad, from which
an estimated fifteen thousand antiquities were looted following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.3
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Together with the theft and deliberate destruction of large portions of the Mosul Museum collection
by Islamist militants in 2015, Iraq’s cultural patrimony has been irredeemably impoverished, with
both the richness of its artistic holdings and its position as a steward of antiquity forever diminished.
Less easily quantifiable than material loss, but potentially more symbolically resonant, is a
second category of loss, that of collective and individual notions of identity. The reaction to the 2019
fire at the Cathedral de Notre-Dame de Paris, eulogized by French president Emmanuel Macron in
an address to the nation as “the epicenter of our life” and “the cathedral of all the French,”4 provides
a stark example of how culturally significant landmarks can instill a sense of identity, worth, and
community. It is for this reason that armed belligerents have used targeted attacks on cultural
property as a way to victimize populations they seek to control. In a practice that has been called
both cultural erasure and cultural cleansing,5 perpetrators attempt to erode victims’ sense of being
and way of life by destroying the cultural touchstones that help define those aspects of identity.
Edward C. Luck, former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General for the Responsibility to
Protect, has gone so far as to call the practice cultural genocide.6
A third indication that the destruction of cultural heritage is of pressing global concern is the
threat it poses to international peace and security when used as a tactic of terrorism. These strategies
most often take the form of intentional destruction of cultural touchstones, or the looting of salable
antiquities to finance arms purchases and/or acts of violence. As illicit trafficking and terrorist attacks
routinely transgress national borders and impact citizens of multiple countries, the issue is one of
global significance, and all states are implicated in the effort to safeguard against it.
At the international policy level, efforts to prevent these crimes or to prosecute those who
carry them out are best represented by the passage of three conventions by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the decades following World War
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II. Unfortunately, however, these conventions—for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict (1954); on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970); and Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972)—have eluded effective enforcement, rendering them
unsatisfactory on their own as a reliable form of deterrence or prosecution.7 UNESCO attempted to
correct some of these deficiencies in the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, which entered into force in 1999.
Roughly contemporaneously, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), convened in 1993 to prosecute war crimes committed during the Balkan conflict of the
1990s, achieved a number of convictions for crimes against cultural property. Its case law established
precedents that, together with improvements introduced by the Second Protocol and by another legal
instrument to emerge around that time, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
succeeded in advancing protections for cultural property at the international level.
Other, more recent developments likewise suggest a more robust international response to
crimes against culture. Since 2015, the UN has become more vocal in its recognition of this particular
danger. Direct appeals from Irina Bokova, former Director-General of UNESCO, and from her
successor, Audrey Azoulay, have helped raise awareness of and mobilize resistance to these
practices.8 Both the ICC and the Security Council have heeded the call to action by issuing,
respectively, a criminal conviction and two resolutions that speak directly to the problem of culture
at risk. At the level of civil society, cultural nongovernmental organizations and museums have
likewise played their part, funding preservation and education initiatives and sponsoring fieldwork
by conservators and art historians. In some instances, the political and civil branches of this effort
have crossed over. For instance, in 2017 the State Hermitage Museum in Saint Petersburg signed a
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Memorandum of Understanding with UNESCO under which each organization pledged to apply its
resources and unique comparative endowments toward defending culture in peril, thus compounding
the potential impact of their efforts.9
That the international community of states seems to be taking more decisive action to protect
cultural heritage at risk suggests a growing normative consensus around the notion that culture is in
need of more robust protections. The aim of this study is to examine the various international legal
frameworks that have led to this point of consensus and to analyze which elements thereof have had
the broadest resonance and benefit.
This study looks at the ways in which cultural heritage has been imperiled since World
War II, a point that coincides with UNESCO’s earliest efforts to safeguard against such threats.
The strengths and limitations of the UNESCO framework are considered in relation to its
implementation up to the present, particularly with respect to its relevance as the dangers to cultural
heritage have evolved. A chapter is devoted to the ICTY’s pioneering jurisprudence regarding
cultural crimes, and another to comparable advances introduced by the Second Protocol and the
Rome Statute. It is argued that key elements of these three legal instruments—the ICTY, the
Second Protocol, and the Rome Statute—have been especially influential in shaping ensuing
frameworks for protecting cultural heritage, as reflected in more recent actions taken by UNESCO,
the ICC, and the Security Council. The study concludes with a brief assessment of recent cultural
crimes in Iraq, Mali, and Syria, and offers possible new frameworks for protecting cultural heritage
that seek to improve on existing ones and respond to the unique nature of the risks that currently
imperil culture in conflict zones.
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II. Literature Review
Any exploration of this topic must begin with the question, What is cultural heritage? Building on
the definition offered above—historic monuments, architectural structures, works of art both large
and small, and other objects of cultural significance—cultural heritage may be understood to take
both tangible and intangible forms. In its tangible form it is often referred to by the analogous term
cultural property, which was first defined by UNESCO in 1954, in its Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (hereinafter, the 1954 Hague
Convention), as:
movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such
as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites;
groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts,
books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific
collections and important collections of books or archives, or of reproductions of the property
defined above.10

The convention considers repositories of such material, for instance, museums and archives, to be
cultural property, as well.11 Intangible cultural heritage, which includes such things as cuisine, folk
traditions, and language, is less easily quantifiable but just as intrinsic to the cultural life of a
people or community. According to Thomas G. Weiss and Nina Connelly, what unites tangible
and intangible heritage as something worth protecting is the actual or perceived value assigned to
it.12 Interestingly, they define this value by its absence—that is, by the degree of loss experienced
when it has been eradicated. They see such loss as “ruinous for cultural identity,” not only for the
communities that experience it directly, but also for “humanity as a whole.”13
While the loss of cultural property to violence and theft is a problem with long historical
roots, concern over the issue began to resonate most acutely in the modern consciousness after
World War II. That conflict witnessed the systematic looting of artworks from public and private
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collections by the Nazis, and it left the built environment of Europe in ruins. It was the latter in
particular—the conspicuous loss of vaunted European treasures—that proved especially shocking
to certain sectors of the international community. As the architectural historian Nicholas Adams
explains, using the damage wrought to the city of Florence as a specific example, “the great
monuments of Italy represent, for many of us, a kind of cultural patria [patrimony] and so it is
understandable that we feel damage to them as damage to us.”14 This sense of a shared culture, at
least among those in the West, galvanized opinions that something more had to be done to
safeguard the world’s art and culture, prompting the passage of the 1954 Hague Convention.
However, as Richard J. Evans makes clear, despite this “international legislation in place to
preserve cultural artifacts in times of war, it is still very difficult to enforce it effectively.”15
That effective enforcement of this legal framework remains elusive is likewise a concern
of Adams, who regards attacks against cultural property—architecture in particular—as a weapon
of would-be genocidaires: “It is as if the protagonists, unable to strangle the last living
representatives of an alien culture, seem to think that with the destruction of place, an architectural
cleansing, as it were, they can eradicate the people who inhabit that place.”16 Adams’s sentiment
is shared by Robert Bevan, who elaborates the position in his book-length exploration of
architectural destruction as a form of cultural erasure.17 Bevan contends that there are clear links
between the decimation of tangible cultural heritage and more ambitious campaigns of genocide.
He supports his argument in part using examples of mass atrocities committed during the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. For example, he identifies the 1993 razing of the Mostar
Bridge in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a deliberate tactic within the larger Croatian effort to eliminate
the Bosniak Muslim population from contested territories.18 According to Bevan, the eradication
of such a significant touchstone from the Bosnian people’s built environment—of both the sense
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of place and the framework of memories it embodied—occasioned a loss of identity that was
tantamount to ethnic cleansing.19
Bevan’s suggestion that culture is fundamental to human identity finds support within the
broader international political community. Former UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova has
spoken of how “such acts of destruction cannot be decoupled from the killing of people,” calling the
two practices “part of the same global strategy, which I call ‘cultural cleansing,’ intended to destroy
identities, tear apart social fabrics, and fuel hatred.”20 It is noteworthy that Bokova considers attacks
against cultural property to be a threat not only to individuals and peoples, but also to international
peace and security. Accordingly, she urged the international community of states to recognize both
the value of heritage and the gravity of its endangerment, calling on both the Security Council and
the ICC to apply their authority more forcefully within the cultural arena.21
Bokova’s call to action was issued in response to a significant uptick in both the frequency
and severity of targeted attacks against culture since 2001, predominantly but not exclusively in
the Middle East. As Metropolitan Museum curators Blair Fowlkes-Childs and Michael Seymour
explain in their appraisal of threats to the region’s ancient heritage, “Some of the most important
archaeological sites of the Roman and Parthian Middle East are now also scenes of modern
destruction.”22 Large-scale losses—and, in some instances, complete annihilation—of important
architectural and sculptural monuments have been a characteristic of the ongoing armed conflicts
in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Sometimes this damage is collateral to military operations,
as was the case with the Great Mosque of Aleppo, one of the most tragic casualties to date of the
Syrian Civil War. Other times, the vandalism is deliberate, as was the case with the Bamiyan
Buddhas in Afghanistan. These ancient sculptures, vestiges of the region’s pre-Islamic past, were
blown up by fundamentalist Islamists who deemed them an apostasy. They are but one example
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of a trend among ideologically driven NSAs to co-opt culturally resonant antiquities as proxy
weapons in their ongoing struggles against the West.23
Theft and trafficking of art objects is likewise an increasingly frequent practice of NSAs,
becoming in recent years “one of the larger transnational markets in illegal goods.”24 Studies suggest
that the so-called Islamic State (ISIL) garners hundreds of thousands of dollars from its trade in
stolen antiquities, which furnishes the Islamist group with the financial resources it needs to carry
out its terrorist violence.25 Bokova has called such looting a “hidden crisis” in the broader fight to
protect heritage in conflict zones, worthy of further study and a tougher international response.26
And just what has been the international response to such threats against cultural heritage?
The 1954 Hague Convention was followed, in 1970 and 1972, by the passage of two additional
UNESCO conventions concerning the protection of cultural property. However, as will be explored
in the following chapter, all three suffer from weaknesses and lacunae that render them insufficient
on their own as a framework for cultural-heritage protection. Indeed, several commentators—
including UNESCO itself—have lamented the consistent failure of these legal instruments to deter
the ruin of cultural property.27 Joris D. Kila attributes this fact, in part, to the changing nature of
armed conflict since World War II—namely, the involvement of belligerent NSAs, which do not
consider themselves subject to the rules of combat as defined by international law.28 The changing
dynamics of contemporary conflict compound the obsolescence of the UNESCO conventions, which
were designed with traditional interstate wars and mutually agreed-upon rules of engagement in
mind. Another factor standing in the way of the conventions’ effectiveness is the built-in loophole
of “military necessity,” whereby damage to structures and monuments during “necessary” combat
operations is dismissed as a regrettable but justifiable corollary of war.29
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Not all legal instruments designed to counter cultural crimes are proving ineffective,
however. Bokova’s appeal to the ICC to wield its authority witnessed its first success in 2016, with
the Court’s conviction of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for overseeing the destruction of cultural
property in Timbuktu, Mali. As argued by the legal scholar Patty Gerstenblith, legal precedents
established through cases such as Al Mahdi’s offer an effective means of protecting cultural heritage
for future generations.30 She and other jurists look back further, to the 1990s, when the ICTY
convicted several individuals for cultural-property crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, to
demonstrate how the resulting case law has been successfully invoked in subsequent trials of this
nature—Al Mahdi’s among them.31 There is evidence to suggest that the jurisprudence of the ICTY
has also helped cement the imperative to protect cultural heritage into customary law, thus fostering
its acceptance as a broad normative principle.32 Such status has been contested at various points since
the passage of the 1954 Hague Convention but, as asserted by Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Legal Adviser
to the International Committee of the Red Cross, it should now be regarded as unequivocal.33
Beyond the existing tools currently available to combat the destruction of cultural heritage,
Weiss and Connelly consider the possibility of framing the issue within the responsibility to protect
(R2P), the international norm that calls on states to recognize their three-pronged duty to “prevent,
react, and rebuild” in the face of mass atrocity.34 Though the norm was developed with the
protection of human life in mind, the authors point out that R2P’s tripartite formulation could apply
to the protection of cultural heritage: (1) conservation efforts to prevent disaster; (2) swift and
decisive reaction to smaller acts of vandalism before they become larger tragedies; and (3)
rebuilding structures and monuments after they have fallen victim to conflict.35 The authors
contend that broadening the set of responsibilities encompassed by R2P to include the protection
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of culture would allow the full heft of its attendant legal obligations to apply, thereby facilitating
both deterrence and prosecution.
The R2P framework finds further relevance when considered in relation to the idea that
attacking cultural property is a form of cultural erasure. Viewed in this light, the practice becomes a
tool of genocide—or, in Edward C. Luck’s estimation, a discrete practice that he calls cultural
genocide.36 As such, it would fall squarely under R2P’s jurisdiction, which includes genocide and
ethnic cleansing among the mass atrocities it was designed to combat. Luck supports his position by
looking closely at the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
in particular, the efforts made by its primary framer, Raphael Lemkin, to include “assaults on a
group’s culture as an essential element of what he would later call genocide.”37 Per Lemkin:
Genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation. It is intended rather to
signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of
such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language,
national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups.38

The term genocide, at least in the estimation of the man who coined the term, could thus apply to
more than the bodily extermination of human beings. It could pertain to a host of practices that chip
away at a people’s sense of identity, worth, and security in the effort to destroy their way of life. And
in Lemkin’s view, “attacks on culture usually came first” in such campaigns of destruction.39
Luck recounts how Lemkin intended the Genocide Convention to include an article
specifically condemning assaults on cultural heritage, but political infighting over its inclusion
threatened to derail the convention altogether, and the article was ultimately scrapped. Luck,
however, feels that time might be ripe for a reappraisal of cultural genocide and its acceptance as a
legitimate policymaking concept. He acknowledges certain obstacles, foremost among them that
“cultural genocide has never been defined, accepted, or codified by the world’s governments,”
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rendering more difficult its adoption as a universalizing framework for preventing and prosecuting
cultural crimes.40 To this point may be added that, in the broader public consciousness, the
destruction of property is superseded in importance by the killing of people, thus relegating the
former to a place of secondary concern.41
Nevertheless, the imperative to protect cultural heritage continues to gain currency as a
normative principle, and efforts to do so at the international level are on the rise. The chapters that
follow trace the evolution of these efforts from the first half of the twentieth century up to the present,
evaluating which frameworks of protection have been the most influential in shaping the current
international response to this perennial problem.
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III. The UNESCO System for Safeguarding Cultural Heritage
While it is often invoked in the literature as the preeminent legal instrument for the protection of
cultural heritage,42 the 1954 Hague Convention, signed on May 14, 1954, was not the first
international treaty that sought to define cultural property or to outline measures for its protection.
Rather, that distinction belongs to the Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions
and Historic Monuments, sponsored by the Roerich Museum, New York, and signed in Washington
on April 15, 1935.43 With only ten states parties—the United States plus nine fellow-members of
what is now the Organization of American States—the Roerich Pact was limited in its jurisdiction,
and therefore in its efficacy, yet it remains exceptional as the first document to build consensus
around the idea “that the treasures of culture [ought to] be respected and protected in time of war and
in peace.”44 Its definition of said treasures is modest, extending to (immovable) “monuments,
museums, [and] scientific, artistic, educational and cultural institutions,” but not specifically to any
(movable) contents contained therein.45 Nevertheless, the Roerich Pact was a pioneering legal
instrument in two respects. First, by singling out the “cultural treasures of peoples” as a category in
need of particular protections, it implied the now well-established principle that cultural property has
a broader, collective significance that distinguishes it from private property, which at that time
already enjoyed certain protections under the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the Laws and
Customs of War.46 The idea of cultural property as something distinct and exceptional is
compounded by the assertion that cultural treasures warrant protection not only during periods of
armed conflict, but also in times of peace, a notion theretofore unprecedented.
The Roerich Pact in many ways proved prescient, for the onset of World War II just a few
years later ushered in a devastation of property, both private and patrimonial, on a scale not seen
since the Napoleonic Wars.47 Likewise troubling with regard to cultural property was the large-scale
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pillage of privately held artworks undertaken by the Nazis, notably under the auspices of the
Einsatzstab Rosenberg, an illicit “cultural ministry” of sorts that carried out systematic looting
campaigns, primarily of Jewish households, and “re-catalogued” the spoils as the patrimony of the
Reich. While the indictments issued by the International Military Tribunal against the war criminals
tried at Nuremberg included charges for crimes against cultural property,48 the war made clear that
more robust legal instruments were needed to keep culture safe.
The 1954 Hague Convention was the first of three such instruments issued by UNESCO in
the following decades to safeguard cultural property and to sanction those who committed crimes
against it. It was followed, in 1970 and 1972, by the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (hereinafter,
UNESCO 1970) and the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage (UNESCO 1972).49 Despite overlap in their aims and content, each convention puts forth
a discrete understanding of cultural property and the nature of the crimes perpetrated against it. The
result is an additive system of protections that attempts to address the full range of crimes against
culture.50 The following section examines how each of these documents defines both cultural
property (or cultural heritage) and cultural crimes, taking the 1954 Hague Convention as the
foundational document to which the 1970 and 1972 conventions act as corollaries. It also assesses
some of their merits and deficiencies as legal instruments, noting their suggested penalties for such
crimes and their positions on how and by whom cultural property ought to be protected.

Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954)
The 1954 Hague Convention is unequivocal in its recognition of both the existence and the distinct
value of cultural property, asserting in its preamble that “damage to cultural property belonging to
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any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind.” The text goes on to
define cultural property in terms considerably more expansive than those given in the Roerich Pact,
which it nonetheless invokes as a precedent, together with both Hague Conventions on the Laws and
Customs of War, before asserting the following:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “cultural property” shall cover, irrespective
of origin or ownership:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people,
such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites;
groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts,
books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific
collections and important collections of books or archives, or of reproductions of the property
defined above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural
property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives,
and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined
in sub-paragraph (a);
(c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).51

Article 4 of the convention identifies the “use of the property . . . for purposes which are likely to
expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict” and “any act of hostility directed
against such property,” as well as “any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of
vandalism,” as crimes worthy of sanction.52 However, determining the appropriate penalty for such
a breach is left to the discretion of states parties, which are charged with taking, “within the
framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal
or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of whatever nationality, who commit or order to be
committed a breach of the present Convention.”53
As for the prevention of such crimes, article 2 outlines the twofold responsibility of states
parties: “safeguarding of” and “respect for” the property in question. To fulfill the first of these
responsibilities, parties must act preventively “to prepare in time of peace for the safeguarding of
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cultural property situated within their own territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed
conflict, by taking such measures as they consider appropriate.”54 Showing “respect for” cultural
property is to refrain from undertaking the sanctioned activities outlined in article 4, as well as to
“prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to” such actions should they be undertaken by other
parties. The convention does not provide specifics as to how states parties should carry out their
charge. However, article 6 mandates a system by which parties must first identify and inventory their
cultural treasures, and article 16 orders that these properties be marked as such with a distinctive
emblem, so as to forewarn belligerents against targeting them. Moreover, chapter 2 of the 1954
Hague Convention is devoted to outlining a system whereby “there may be placed under special
protection a limited number of refuges intended to shelter movable cultural property in the event of
armed conflict, of centers containing monuments and [of] other immovable cultural property of very
great importance.”55
The most immediate and enduring contribution of the 1954 Hague Convention lies in its use,
for the first time in any international treaty, of the term cultural property, thereby entering into the
lexicon of international law a class of property distinct from private property, deserving of distinct
protections.56 Moreover, the text’s definition thereof is notably comprehensive,57 improving on the
Roerich Pact by including movable property within its protections while allowing for a broad
interpretation of its scope by extending to property of either a religious or a secular significance.
Equally laudable is the convention’s equation of “damage to cultural property” with “damage
to the cultural heritage of all mankind,” thus making clear from the outset that it elevates cultural
property to a level of importance beyond the mere material (as the word property might imply).58
While its subtle distinction of property from heritage suggests that the former is a sub-element of,
and not an interchangeable term for, the latter, as has become the case in the literature,59 the 1954
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Hague Convention remains a crucial normative instrument that has helped embed the now broadly
accepted notion of a shared global humanity sustained by its collective cultural achievements. And
indeed, more recent efforts to protect cultural property imperiled by armed conflict have been
bolstered by such universalist conceptions of the value of culture, which have helped not only to
galvanize the international response in defense of humankind’s shared heritage, but also to shape
normative consensus around the increasingly urgent need to protect culture at risk.60
Despite these considerable merits, the 1954 Hague Convention carries certain liabilities.
Its first and arguably most glaring defect is that it all but negates its protections in cases of “military
necessity”—that is, cultural property can be targeted, damaged, or destroyed if doing so is deemed
necessary to advance a military objective.61 The military waiver represents a continuum from
earlier treaties: the Roerich Pact, as well as Hague Convention (IV) and the Geneva Conventions,
contain similar caveats allowing for instances of lawful destruction of property when military
operations require it.62 But, what constitutes “military necessity,” and who is authorized to declare
it? The concept is not defined in the treaty and thus left open to subjective interpretation, rendering
it apt to manipulation or easy deployment. Indeed, a warning that such a proviso could be exploited
to serve individual interests was issued as early as 1943 by General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Speaking to Allied troops, he reminded them that “the phrase ‘military necessity’ is sometimes
used where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience. . . . I do not want it to cloak
slackness or indifference.”63
Second, it cannot be forgotten that the 1954 Hague Convention was issued in response to,
and therefore directly shaped by, the proceedings of World War II. That conflict was, perhaps, the
last war of the modern era to conform to the “old war” format—that is, large-scale or “total” war,
fought by the official armed forces of state-level belligerents and conducted across national borders
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for the purpose of conquering territory.64 Armed conflicts in the decades since have, by contrast,
been primarily intrastate, and they often involve at least one NSA, whether a terrorist or other
ideologically motivated group whose purpose is to control populations, or members of a resistance
movement acting in opposition to a repressive government.65 While article 19 of the convention does
ensure that its provisions apply to “conflicts not of an international character,” meaning that its
mandate can extend to intrastate disputes, debate continues as to whether NSAs are bound to abide
by the convention and are subject to sanction if they breach it (discussed further in chapter 6).66 As
damage to or destruction of cultural property becomes less a corollary of total war and increasingly
a tool wielded by NSAs in their campaigns of terror and cultural erasure, the 1954 Hague Convention
seems almost quaint in its insistence that belligerents take care not to target each other’s cultural
heritage when planning their battlefield attacks. Moreover, by failing to address NSAs and the tactics
of the “new wars,” the convention’s legal reach is limited in ways that render it insufficiently
effective for our contemporary moment.
Third, the convention places an undue burden of both prevention and prosecution on states
parties. With regard to prevention, the call for states to inventory and visibly mark all their cultural
property with a distinctive emblem is both onerous and unrealistic, particularly for those states that
lack adequate resources and/or infrastructure to do so.67 That such under-resourced states are those
that are also prone to instability, and therefore to outbreaks of armed conflict, means that their
cultural heritage is often at more sustained risk, underscoring the futility of such a system of
prevention. One need only look to the example of the National Museum of Iraq, the large-scale
looting of which in 2003 was facilitated by insufficient cataloguing by a staff inadequately equipped
to do so, thus allowing much of what was stolen to vanish without a trace.68 As for prosecution,
article 28 of the convention mandates that states parties “take within the framework of their ordinary
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criminal jurisdiction all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions” on
those who have breached the convention. Not only are these provisions too vaguely worded and
broadly interpretable to effectively criminalize specific offences against cultural property,69 but they
also rely on states to have in place domestic legislation pertaining to the same subject-matter
jurisdiction as the convention.
It should also be noted that, like all treaties, the 1954 Hague Convention is limited in
application to only those states that have ratified it. Moreover, it is not merely the number but the
identity of states parties that matters in establishing a treaty’s ultimate influence and efficacy; the
buy-in of certain influential states is key. The U.S., for instance, only ratified the convention in 2009,
and the U.K. in 2017, meaning that, for much of its existence, the convention has lacked the added
legitimacy that ratification by these world powers would have offered.70 Official state buy-in is less
crucial if the elements of a treaty are adopted as customary law, as reflected through usus (state
practice) and opinio juris (broad acceptance as legal principle). Legal and scholarly opinions have
varied as to whether and/or when the 1954 Hague Convention attained customary status,71 a
consideration that will be explored in greater depth in the chapters that follow.
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property (1970)
With its focus on import, export, and transfer, the UNESCO convention signed on November 14,
1970, addresses movable items of cultural property, namely those which, “on religious or secular
grounds,” are designated “as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art
or science.”72 The nature of the objects that fall under its mandate thus crosses over with those object
covered by the 1954 Hague Convention, but per the 1970 treaty, such a designation might extend as
readily to “products of archaeological excavations,” “pictures, paintings and drawings,” and “rare
manuscripts” as it does to “specimens of fauna,” “objects of ethnological interest,” or even “postage,
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revenue and similar stamps.”73 The variety of objects named in the convention thus suggests a
broadening understanding of what constitutes culture, as well as an incipient conflation of artistic
treasures with those from the natural world.
As to the crimes it sets out to prohibit, UNESCO 1970 states succinctly that “the import,
export or transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the provisions adopted under
the Convention by the States Parties thereto, shall be illicit.”74 The immediate implications are theft
and looting, perpetrated by groups or individuals motivated by personal profit. However, articles 5
to 7 of the convention make clear that such crimes are on a par with those committed by stewards of
cultural property, for instance, museums or government ministries, that either fail to ensure the
proper transfer of objects under their stewardship or engage in the trade or acquisition of objects of
questionable or unknown provenance. These practices are, according to the convention, a
comparable form of theft, one that causes the “impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the
countries of origin of such properties.”75 Article 5 thus requires the inventorying of cultural treasures
by trained, knowledgeable personnel, and article 6 mandates a system of certification for all items
of cultural property so that their transfer between parties can be traced. Article 7 forbids parties to
acquire or deaccession cultural property outside the system thus prescribed.
As for the prosecution of these crimes, like the 1954 Hague Convention, UNESCO 1970
defers to states’ domestic legal systems “to impose penalties or administrative sanctions on any
person responsible for infringing the prohibitions” outlined in the convention.76 Herein lies one of
UNESCO 1970’s merits, for most states have existing, and frequently robust, legislation pertaining
to the theft or misappropriation of property. Accordingly, they can readily apply the same subjectmatter jurisdiction to cultural property, thus facilitating the prosecution of crimes of this nature.
On the other hand, UNESCO 1970 likewise shares with its predecessor the placement of a
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significant burden of responsibility on states parties to safeguard their own cultural property, not
least through the establishment of systems of registration and inventory that may lie beyond the
capabilities of states that lack the resources and infrastructure to do so. However, it can be regarded
overall as a constructive complement to the 1954 Hague Convention in that it expands the
definition of cultural property, addresses crimes against culture beyond damage and destruction,
and is applicable in peacetime, not only in periods of armed conflict.
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972)
UNESCO 1972 is notable for its use of the term cultural heritage rather than cultural property. It
defines the term as follows:
Monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or
structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features,
which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;
Groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture,
their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point
of view of history, art or science;
Sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological
sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or
anthropological point of view.77

As with UNESCO 1970, the type of object addressed in UNESCO 1972 is similar to that referred
to as cultural property in the 1954 Hague Convention, yet it is important to note here the mention
of their “universal value,” through which they take on the new designation of cultural heritage.
The use of the qualifier universal underscores the notion, discussed briefly above, that cultural
property is a constituent part of a broader, less tangible concept of a culture shared across
humanity, irrespective of nationality or ethnicity. In this way it represents a significant departure
from its immediate predecessor, UNESCO 1970, which advances a state-centric attitude toward
cultural patrimony and its preservation within its territory of origin.78 Accordingly, UNESCO 1972
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shifts some of the burden of protecting cultural heritage onto the collective community of states,
asserting that “it is incumbent on the international community as a whole to participate in the
protection of the cultural and natural heritage.”79 While the convention still calls on each state
party “to identify and delineate” the properties that comprise its cultural patrimony,80 as well as to
recognize its own “duty of ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and
transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage . . . situated on its territory,”81
it also provides for the establishment of an intergovernmental World Heritage Committee and an
associated fund to help maintain and protect said heritage.82
UNESCO 1972 is distinct from its predecessors in that its focus is neither to address crimes
against culture nor to suggest a means of prosecuting them. Rather, it provides for the administration
of international assistance to states whose heritage is in peril. It also introduces the opportunity to
designate significant cultural properties as World Heritage sites. Though the designation is
something of an honorific—it affords a site a certain measure of prestige, as well as provisions to
assist in its preservation, but it does not carry specific penalties if sites thus designated are damaged
or destroyed—it has been invoked in legal cases and used to determine the punishment for crimes
against culture (to be discussed further in subsequent chapters).
Conclusion
The three conventions that comprise UNESCO’s original system of cultural protection are in many
ways laudable and exceptional. They speak to a recognition at the international level that cultural
heritage is of distinct character and value, and therefore deserving of distinct protections. Inherent
weaknesses in their frameworks, however, particularly in the 1954 Hague Convention, rendered
these treaties ineffectual on their own as either a preventative or a punitive measure against cultural
crimes. These failings became especially lamentable in 1991, when violence engulfed the Balkan
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region and generated the gravest threat to cultural heritage since World War II. As will be explored
in the following chapter, it was not the UNESCO system but the workings of an ad hoc criminal
tribunal that proved to be a more effective tool in the effort to protect cultural heritage at the
international level.
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IV. The Innovative Case Law of the ICTY
Despite provisions laid out in the 1954 Hague Convention to facilitate its execution in the event of
armed conflict, as recently as 2006, its system of regulations was noted to have “never operated as
designed,” nor even to have been “implemented in whole.”83 The weaknesses of the UNESCO
system are perhaps most evident in the fact that it would take forty years after the convention came
into force to see the first convictions for cultural-property crimes. These were handed down in the
former Yugoslavia (SFRY), which during a series of civil wars throughout the 1990s witnessed a
searing devastation of its cultural heritage. The convictions were issued by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the ad hoc tribunal established in 1993 by the UN to
investigate wartime atrocities committed in the SFRY beginning in 1991. By addressing crucial
lacunae in the 1954 Hague Convention, as well as fulfilling key but untested provisions therein, the
proceedings of the ICTY offered a legal framework for protecting cultural heritage that succeeded
where the UNESCO framework had failed. Among the lacunae filled or provisions bolstered by the
tribunal’s jurisprudence were: (1) recourse to individual criminal responsibility; (2) the “military
necessity” loophole; (3) respect for cultural property per se; and (4) the linking of cultural destruction
to atrocity crimes prosecutable under international humanitarian law (IHL). The workings of the
tribunal also fostered the acceptance of the 1954 Hague Convention into customary law and helped
embed the normative consensus that cultural heritage warrants robust international protections.
Destruction of Culture in the Former Yugoslavia
While a full accounting of the decade-long conflict in the SFRY is beyond the scope of this study, it
is relevant to note that the dissolution of the formerly Communist federation into its six84 constituent
republics was characterized by extreme sectarian violence along ethnic, nationalistic, and religious
lines.85 Among the most heinous acts investigated by the tribunal concerned ethnic cleansing, a
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practice by which members of a certain demographic group are purged from a territory for no other
reason than their belonging to that demographic.86 In the case of the SFRY, forced displacement and
systematic rape were among the tactics used to purge or, in the case of births occasioned by rape,
“dilute” the purity of ethnic or religious populations living in areas claimed by belligerent factions.
The demographic affiliations of both perpetrators and victims of war crimes in the SFRY
varied throughout the course of the conflict, but a particularly high level of violence was leveled
against Muslim populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, known as Bosniaks. Bosniaks were
victimized by both Croats and Serbs, who sought to purge them from areas within their territorial
borders or from Bosnian lands that each claimed as part of their respective republics. In their turn,
Croats (who are predominantly Roman Catholic) and Serbs (predominantly Eastern Orthodox)
were likewise targeted for their ethnic and/or religious identities. Beyond the genocidal methods
noted above, one tactic used in these campaigns of violence involved the destruction of houses of
worship and other cultural touchstones that formed the fabric of life in these communities.
According to a report by the Council of Europe, in only the first two years of fighting, from 1991
to 1993, an estimated 468 churches and 42 monasteries in Croatia were damaged or destroyed,
while 613 mosques suffered the same fate in Bosnia-Herzegovina.87 In addition to these religious
structures, a number of secular sites of historic and architectural importance were also devastated,
among them the Old Town of Dubrovnik, Croatia (discussed further below), and the sixteenthcentury Mostar Bridge in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which crumbled into the Neretva River in 1993
after sustaining months of artillery fire.88
The ICTY Statute
Such destruction did not go unnoticed: when drafting the statute of the ICTY,89 the framers turned
to a precedent set by the International Military Tribunal (IMT), which had overseen the trials at
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Nuremberg for war crimes committed during World War II. Article 6 of the IMT charter, adopted in
1945, asserts the tribunal’s power to prosecute “plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.”90 This
language was adopted almost wholescale by the ICTY in article 3 of its statute, which reads:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs
of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and
education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.91

With the addition of sub-article 3(d), the ICTY went a step further than its predecessor, invoking the
protected status of “institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art.” As such, the tribunal signaled its acknowledgment of cultural
property as understood by the UNESCO system.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, when determining the international conventions that
would form the basis for its subject-matter jurisdiction, the ICTY did not include the 1954 Hague
Convention, for at that time, the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General were unconvinced
that the convention had yet attained the status of customary law.92 In the view of the tribunal,
The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of
international customary law is the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims; the Hague Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October
1907; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December
1948; and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945.93
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While both the Geneva Conventions and Hague Convention (IV) include basic proscriptions against
targeting cultural sites in times of war,94 the omission of the 1954 Hague Convention from this
assembly of legal instruments speaks both to its deficiencies and to its sparing implementation. As
has been noted, acceptance into customary law is contingent on not only opinio juris (acceptance as
legal principle), but also usus (state practice), and both were lacking with respect to the 1954 Hague
Convention, lending credence to the ICTY’s failure to recognize it as custom. Nevertheless, the
tribunal’s case law tells a different story, revealing a subscription to the convention’s values while
clarifying and fulfilling a number of its as-yet untested provisions.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
Article 28 of the 1954 Hague Convention requires states parties to defer to their own domestic
legal codes in order to prosecute crimes against culture.95 The idea is admirable in theory but weak
in practice, for the convention fails to provide states parties with a specified listing of prosecutable
offences. Instead, using generalized terms, the convention condemns only the “use of [cultural]
property for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed
conflict,” as well as “any act of hostility directed against such property.”96 Not only is the
understanding of these provisions left open to interpretation, but also, “without a clear-cut
definition of offences . . . it becomes more difficult to set the boundaries within which individual
criminal liability may be upheld.”97 The convention thus lacks legitimacy with respect to both
quantifying cultural crimes worthy of sanction and holding individuals responsible for them.
The failure of the 1954 Hague Convention to adequately address individual criminal
responsibility is one of five weakness cited in a report issued by UNESCO in 1993 following a broad
review of the treaty’s efficacy (hereinafter, the 1993 Review).98 Taking aim at the vague language
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of article 28,99 the 1993 Review notes in particular the convention’s failure to define either
jurisdiction (instead implicating offenders “of whatever nationality”) or a prosecutorial process that
could be upheld in any state, regardless of variations in systems of governance or criminal justice.100
The absence of such clarifications creates obstacles to prosecution, not least the identification of
individual perpetrators and the nature and extent of their offences.
International criminal tribunals, on the other hand, exist for the very purpose of assigning
individual culpability for crimes of an international nature.101 In one of its earliest cases, the ICTY
made clear that it would count crimes against cultural property among such offences. Dusko Tadic
was a leader of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the principal party of ethnic Serbs living within
the territorial boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SDS, under Tadic’s command, led systematic
campaigns of violence against Bosniaks. In 1995 the ICTY convicted Tadic for an array of crimes,
including the targeting of mosques in Bosniak communities.102 Tadic appealed, and in the process
of both upholding his conviction and reaffirming its own jurisdiction to issue it, the ICTY delineated
four conditions that had to be met for an offence to be subject to prosecution under article 3 of its
statute. According to the fourth “Tadic Condition,” as these provisions have subsequently become
known, “the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual
criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.”103
That Tadic’s conviction was upheld confirms that the ICTY considered him individually
culpable for his crimes, despite their execution under the aegis of the SDS. These crimes included
the targeting of cultural property, specifically, the razing of mosques. Thus itemized, the act became
a quantifiable offence, and the sentence handed down for it could provide guidance on appropriate
sanctions for future crimes of the sort. The Tadic ruling thus gave body to the indeterminate
violations and sanctions only suggested by article 28 of the 1954 Hague Convention, and established
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a template for criminalizing individual acts against culture that could—and would—be applied in
subsequent ICTY cases.104 One of these cases itself bolstered the principle of individual criminal
responsibility with respect to cultural property. In its conviction of Pavle Strugar and Miodrag Jokic
for their part in destroying the Old Town of Dubrovnik (discussed in further detail below), the
tribunal held that individual criminal responsibility could be assigned to attacks on cultural targets
during conflicts of either a civil or an interstate nature.105 It thus fulfilled the untested provision of
article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention, which asserts the convention’s applicability to conflicts of
a non-international character. Additionally, the tribunal’s sentencing of the two men established
precedent for assigning the maximum allowable penalties for commissions of cultural crimes.106
Military Necessity Loophole
As noted in the previous chapter, the 1954 Hague Convention failed to correct a flawed inheritance.
With its article 4(2), it maintained a feature shared by the Roerich Pact, the Geneva Conventions,
and Hague Convention (IV) that allowed for a revocation of its protections when the target of
destruction was one of “military necessity.” The 1993 Review is unequivocal in its stance toward
this loophole, calling on states parties to renounce any provisions that allow for military waivers.107
Elaborating on this suggestion, Patrick J. Boylan, the author of the report, asserts:
Those drafting the 1954 Convention probably envisaged war in terms of well-defined international
conflicts between structured and well-disciplined military commands on the pattern of the two
World Wars. However, looking back over history this was probably a mistake. . . . It has to be
recognised that the deliberate targeting and destruction of important monuments and collections
have become increasingly common features of both internal and international conflicts in many
parts of the world.108

In other words, as the nature of armed conflicts and their belligerents evolved since 1954, the idea
that an important monument or work of architecture might be targeted for any reason other than to
inflict intentional damage on an enemy had become obsolete.
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The ICTY cast judgments on questions of military necessity a number of times, and in almost
all cases found the provision to be inapplicable.109 Notably, the tribunal tackled two aspects of the
issue about which the 1954 Hague Convention was silent—that is, converting the use of cultural
properties in ways that would render them military targets, and targeting proximate structures in an
effort to underhandedly eradicate others of cultural value. This last strategy was employed by Mladen
Naletelic, who, as a commander of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), the military arm of a Croat
political faction, ordered the destruction of mosques in the Bosnian cities of Sovici and Doljani in
an effort to drive out Muslim populations there.110 He claimed that the mosques were destroyed
collateral to lawful attacks on adjacent buildings, which he cited as legitimate military targets. The
tribunal, however, rejected the argument that “the mere fact that an institution is in the ‘immediate
vicinity of a military objective’ justifies its destruction.”111 The ruling thus plugged a gaping hole in
the 1954 Hague Convention while adding further clarity to a provision that had long been susceptible
to broad interpretation and/or exploitation.
Cultural Property Per Se
The use in the 1954 Hague Convention of the term cultural property introduced into IHL a class
of property distinct from private property, not only casting light on its unique characteristics, but
also endowing it with unique forms of protection. As such, the convention went an important
step further than both Hague Convention (IV) and the Geneva Conventions. While these
foundational instruments of IHL recognized the need to protect cultural heritage,112 they did so
according to what legal scholar Micaela Frulli calls a “civilian-use” approach to the protection
of property—that is, for the primary purpose of preventing injury or death to the people who use
it or who live in its vicinity.113 A museum or house of worship would therefore be pegged for
protection for the same reasons that a hospital or school would be: not for its intrinsic value,
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artistic merit, or cultural significance but, rather, for its use by a population that might be harmed
by its destruction. By distinguishing cultural property as something unique, the 1954 Hague
Convention took an important step in advancing a “cultural-value” approach—that is, one based
on intrinsic merit.114 This effort was bolstered by the passage of UNESCO 1972, with its
suggestion of a universal heritage shared across humanity.
A judgment issued by the ICTY in 2001 finally gave body the 1954 Hague Convention’s
enshrinement of cultural property per se. In it, the gravity of the perpetrators’ crime was determined
solely on the intrinsic cultural merit of the targets. Pavle Strugar was a commander in the Yugoslav
Peoples’ Army (JNA), a subunit of which was directed by Miodrag Jokic; both men were
instrumental in the JNA’s devastation of Dubrovnik in late 1991. A sustained campaign of aerial
bombardment decimated large portions of the Croatian city, including the historic Old Town,
designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1979 for the richness of its cityscape. The indictment
of Strugar and Jokic is notable for its enumeration of these architectural treasures, as well as its
lengthy accounting of the city’s storied history dating back to the medieval period.115 These factors
were instrumental in securing the two men’s conviction for “unjustified devastation,” “unlawful
attacks,” and “wilful damage to historic monuments,” among other crimes.116 The Jokic trial
judgment in particular lays bare the extent to which the tribunal considered the Old Town’s cultural
significance when rendering its decision:
51. The whole of the Old Town of Dubrovnik was considered . . . an especially important part of
the world cultural heritage. . . . The shelling attack on the Old Town was an attack not only against
the history and heritage of the region, but also against the cultural heritage of humankind.
52. Restoration of buildings of this kind, when possible, can never return the buildings to their state
prior to the attack because a certain amount of original, historically authentic, material will have
been destroyed, thus affecting the inherent value of the buildings.
53. [I]t is a crime of even greater seriousness to direct an attack on an especially protected site. . . .
The unlawful attack on the Old Town must therefore be viewed as especially wrongful conduct.
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55. The gravity of the crimes committed by the convicted person also stems from the degree of his
participation in the crimes. . . . The parties have agreed that Miodrag Jokic was aware of the
protected status of the whole of the Old Town as a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage site.117

Here, we see a number of remarkable assertions: that losses of cultural property impoverish the
heritage of all humankind; that full restitution or compensation for such losses is impossible, for the
value of cultural property is intrinsic and therefore unquantifiable; and that attacking a World
Heritage site warrants a graver punishment than attacking a site of lesser cultural importance. The
judgment was therefore groundbreaking with respect to the valuation of cultural property per se,
establishing legal precedent that renders indisputable the heightened gravity of its destruction
compared with that of other forms of property.
Destruction of Culture as an Atrocity Crime
Persecution—that is, “the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity”118— is defined in IHL as a
crime against humanity. Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, meanwhile,
asserts that “everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, [and]
to enjoy the arts.”119 It follows, then, that depriving people of their inherent human right to partake
in arts and culture by destroying touchstones of cultural life could qualify as a form of persecution
when carried out systematically against a specific demographic. Accordingly, doing so would be
subject not only to laws that address cultural property, but also to those provisions of IHL that address
crimes against humanity and other atrocity crimes.
The 1993 Report recognized the potential of linking cultural destruction to atrocity crimes.
Indeed, it recommended an investigation as to “whether the deliberate obliteration of all evidence of
the existence of an ethnic, religious or other group identity through destruction of their physical
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symbols of identity could in extremis fall within the definition of the crime of genocide under the
1948 Genocide Convention.”120 The idea was not unprecedented: as noted at the start of this study,
Raphael Lemkin, the principal framer of the Genocide Convention, held similar ideas.121 For its part,
the ICTY decided that “customary international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts
seeking the physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group,” concluding that “an
enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to
annihilate these elements . . . would not fall under the definition of genocide.”122 Nevertheless, in its
2001 conviction of Radislav Krstic for his participation in the genocide at Srebrenica, the ICTY
pointed out that, “where there is physical or biological destruction, there are often simultaneous
attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks
which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group.”123
And indeed, Krstic’s attacks against mosques were cited as corroborating evidence of his crime.
Per its statute, the ICTY’s subject-matter jurisdiction extended to war crimes (defined as
“grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949” and “violations of the laws and customs of
war”), genocide, and crimes against humanity; listed among the latter are “persecutions on
political, racial and religious grounds.”124 The tribunal’s jurisprudence in several cases, among
them that of Radoslav Brdjanin, made clear that “destruction of cultural property may amount to
persecution and thus to a crime against humanity.”125 As vice president of the self-declared
Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic) of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brdjanin led attacks against nonSerb populations, both Muslim and Croat, within the breakaway territory. His 1999 indictment by
the ICTY included one count of persecution for activities that included not only murder, sexual
assault, and forcible deportation, but also “wanton destruction of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
Croat villages and areas, including the destruction of religious and cultural buildings.”126 The trial
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judgment found Brdjanin guilty on this count, deeming his destruction of property to “occupy the
same level of gravity as the other crimes enumerated.”127 It likewise noted Brdjanin’s “specific
discriminatory intent” in targeting only Muslim and Roman Catholic sites, leaving Serbian
Orthodox properties almost wholly intact.128 The mention of intent is significant, because it
suggests the presence of mens rea—that is, a foreknowledge or understanding by the accused of
the wrongdoing inherent in the commission of a particular crime. According to Hirad Abtahi, Legal
Adviser to the Presidency of the ICC, persecution “requires a mental element specific to crimes
against humanity” to qualify as such.129 The tribunal thus succeeded in connecting cultural
destruction to the atrocity crime of persecution, establishing precedent for the application of certain
provisions of IHL to crimes of this nature.
Conclusion
UNESCO heeded the recommendations of the 1993 Review, and in 1999 introduced a protocol to
the 1954 Hague Convention that sought to fill lacunae, correct missteps, and shore up weaknesses.
That some of these deficiencies had already been addressed by the ICTY suggests that the imperative
to protect cultural heritage had resonance as a normative concept, despite holes in the existing legal
framework. As will be examined in the following chapter, the succession of developments that began
with the 1954 Hague Convention and continued through the proceedings of the ICTY would find
further, more potent expression in the Second Protocol, as well as the Rome Statute of the ICC. The
latter was developed at roughly the same time as the Second Protocol and would likewise include
helpful provisions for the protection of cultural property.
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V. Traces of ICTY Precedent in the Second Protocol and the Rome Statute
In 1991, just as the crisis in the SFRY was taking root, delegates at the twenty-sixth session of the
UNESCO General Conference came to the grim conclusion that “the international system of
safeguards of the world cultural heritage [did] not appear to be satisfactory, as indicated by the
ever-increasing dangers due to armed conflicts.”130 The ensuing devastation of cultural property
in the Balkans would prove this assessment correct, but evidence of the system’s weakness could
already be seen in the widespread looting of temples in Cambodia during and after the Khmer
Rouge regime (1975–79) and in the damage wrought to a number of significant Iranian cultural
sites during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88). It was for this reason that UNESCO ordered its
abovementioned review of the 1954 Hague Convention, resulting in the 1993 Report.131 The latter
concluded that an additional protocol to the convention was needed to correct the following key
deficiencies: (1) the exception granted to “military necessity”; (2) recourse to individual criminal
responsibility; (3) the system of precautionary measures; (4) the system of special protection; and
(5) institutional impediments that hindered full and effective implementation of the convention.132
The Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (hereinafter, the Second Protocol) came into force in
1999. UNESCO hoped that, by redressing the five main problems identified in the 1993 Report,
the protocol would prove the lynchpin in securing once and for all the protective intentions of the
1954 Hague Convention and its corollary conventions of 1970 and 1972.133 The Second Protocol
came into being contemporaneous to the ICTY, and while it did so independently of that
tribunal,134 in several ways it can be said to have codified into treaty law some of the precedents
established by its jurisprudence. Evidence of this consonance can be seen in the protocol’s
approach to three of the four points cited as ICTY innovations in the preceding chapter: the military
necessity loophole, cultural property per se, and individual criminal responsibility. With regard to
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the fourth ICTY innovation explored in chapter 4—the linking of cultural crimes to atrocity crimes
prosecutable under IHL—the tribunal’s case law finds greatest crossover with another legal
instrument to emerge at about the same time, the Rome Statute. Together with the Second Protocol,
the Rome Statute reflects the prescience of ICTY case law in identifying effective ways to
prosecute crimes against culture in conflict zones.
Military Necessity Loophole
Article 6 of the Second Protocol is a landmark in cultural-property protection, for it effectively
ensures that “military necessity can never justify the demolition of cultural property.”135 As such,
it plugs once and for all the loophole sustained by article 4(2) of the 1954 Hague Convention,
which allows states to waive their obligations toward cultural property “in cases where military
necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.”136 The ICTY had demonstrated a consistent
skepticism toward defendants’ claims of military necessity to justify their attacks on cultural
property, rejecting them in several cases.137 Article 6(a) of the Second Protocol codifies this
skepticism into law by defining what is meant by “military necessity” and the circumstances that
might “imperatively require” its invocation in an armed conflict:
(a) a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity . . . may only be invoked to direct an act
of hostility against cultural property when and for as long as:
i. that cultural property has, by its function, been made into a military objective; and
ii. there is no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military advantage to that offered by
directing an act of hostility against that objective.138

The first thing to note is the use in sub-article 6(a)(i) of the more precise term military objective,
which is defined in the Geneva Conventions as targets which, “by their nature, location, purpose,
or use, make an effective contribution to military action, and whose partial or total destruction,
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capture, or neutralization . . . offers a definite military advantage.”139 It is generally agreed that
cultural property could never, by its inherent nature or purpose, be considered a military
objective.140 It follows, therefore, that cultural sites could only be considered militarily
advantageous for their location or use.
Regarding location, sub-article 6(a)(ii) requires that there be “no feasible alternative
available to obtain a similar military advantage,” which puts a significant burden of proof on those
who would target a cultural site; after all, “there are almost always alternatives to circumvent [a]
property.”141 As for use, a cultural property could only be made into something militarily useful—
for instance, appropriated as a shelter for troops or a store for armaments—by those seeking to
capitalize on its protected status and/or strategic location. Seeing that sub-article 6(b) of the protocol
goes on to dictate that cultural property may only be exposed “to destruction or damage when and
for as long as no choice is possible between such use of the cultural property and another feasible
method for obtaining a similar military advantage,” it is all but assured that cultural sites cannot be
readily appropriated for legitimate use. It likewise follows that cultural property damaged or
destroyed in conflict could only have been targeted by belligerents for reasons other than those
deemed permissible by law.
Cultural Property Per Se
Should there still be any doubt as to whether military necessity could ever be a feasible justification
for targeting cultural sites, sub-article 7(c) of the Second Protocol dictates that belligerents must
“refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental damage to
cultural property . . . which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”142 This provision not only serves to clarify the principles laid out in article
6 of the protocol, but also signals a “consideration of qualitative as well as quantitative factors”
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with regard to the nature of cultural property and its heightened intrinsic value with respect to other
forms of property.143 Indeed, sub-article 7(c) has been interpreted as an acknowledgment that “the
quantum of incidental damage caused to cultural property comprises not only the raw amount
destroyed or otherwise harmed but also its cultural significance.”144 It thus invokes the principle
of proportionality, which ensures that the damage wrought by combat does not exceed the
advantage sought.145 As such, it requires a value judgment by those who would seek to target a
cultural property. And by asking belligerents to recognize that destroying cultural property is
worse than destroying other forms of property, the protocol asserts the inherent and rarified value
of cultural property per se.
The ICTY had underscored a similar point in its prosecution of Pavle Strugar and Miodrag
Jokic for their destruction of the Old Town of Dubrovnik, citing the city’s exceptional cultural and
historical merits as aggravating factors of their crime.146 As will be explored in greater detail in the
next chapter, this precedent, having been codified into law by the Second Protocol, would be invoked
in a landmark ruling of the ICC in 2016 regarding the destruction of cultural heritage sites in Mali.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
It is the nature of ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY to take “norms initially applicable to states and
transform them into individual criminal offences,” thereby assigning to individual perpetrators
responsibility for offences of an international nature.147 That the list of offences tried by the ICTY
included crimes against culture represented the first time since Nuremberg that individuals were held
to account for the destruction of cultural heritage, even if carried out during a state-level conflict.
The ICTY’s efforts were also significant because, by itemizing such precise offences as Dusko
Tadic’s razing of mosques, they helped give shape to article 28 of the 1954 Hague Convention. This
nebulous article defines neither specific, prosecutable offences against cultural property nor the
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requisite penalties for committing them. It instead appeals to the “ordinary criminal jurisdiction” of
states parties and defers to their own judgment as to what form of punishment—whether “penal or
disciplinary”—would be most appropriate.148 Indeed, article 28 was one of the foremost weaknesses
highlighted by the 1993 Report, and its emendation was “one of the major raisons d’être of the
Second Protocol.”149
Article 15 of the protocol corrects the convention’s omissions—and formalizes the precedent
taken by the ICTY—by itemizing five prosecutable offences against culture: (1) extensive
destruction or appropriation of cultural property; (2) making cultural property the object of attack;
(3) theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property; (4)
making cultural property under enhanced protection the object of attack; and (5) using cultural
property under enhanced protection or its immediate surroundings in support of military action.150
Further, the article specifies that, “each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to
establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in this Article and to make
such offences punishable by appropriate penalties.”151 By requiring states to formalize the
criminality of these specific offences, rather than simply deferring to existing, and potentially
inadequate, elements of their domestic legal systems, the Second Protocol ensures that states
afforded cultural crimes a level of seriousness that had theretofore been lacking.
It is worth noting that the last two items on the list of offences refer specifically to properties
placed under the new system of enhanced protection,152 while the first three refer to all cultural
property in general. Establishing a system of enhanced protection was one of the primary aims of
the Second Protocol, for the existing regime of “special protection” established under chapter 2 of
the 1954 Hague Convention had been dismissed by the 1993 Review as more or less a failure.153
While a full review of enhanced protection is beyond the scope of this study, it can be argued that
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its establishment represents an effort to differentiate degrees of gravity in crimes against culture.154
Doing so further reinforces recourse to criminal individual responsibility, for in the words of the
legal scholar Micaela Frulli,
introducing a differentiation in gravity between acts perpetrated against the different elements of
cultural property . . . is utterly consistent with one of the main functions of criminal law: to express
retribution and, more precisely, not only to express the fact of wrong-doing but also to articulate
the degree of wrong-doing. And it better serves the interests of an effective criminal justice.155

Cultural Crimes as Atrocity Crimes
As the foundational document of the International Criminal Court, the Rome Statute is the
preeminent international legal instrument addressing the proscription and prosecution of atrocity
crimes—that is, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.156 Included in its list of
prosecutable war crimes is the act of “intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, [and] historic monuments.”157 The language
itself is not altogether unique; it offers a comparable variation of that used in the 1954 Hague
Convention and its precedents, as well as in the ICTY Statute. However, its use in the Rome Statute
signals once and for all an acknowledgement of the seriousness of such acts of violence, equating
them in gravity with the crimes considered to be the most heinous in international law.158
In addition to war crimes, Thomas G. Weiss and Nina Connelly contend that the Rome
Statute’s definition of another atrocity crime, crimes against humanity, “contains two points that
could readily be interpreted to include the destruction of cultural heritage.”159 These are:
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, . . . or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury
to body or to mental or physical health.160
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Connecting attacks on cultural property to persecution was an approach employed by the ICTY in
its prosecution of Radoslav Brdjanin. Here, we see the Rome Statute expanding on the concept to
include national, ethnic, and cultural grounds for discriminatory intent, which are absent from the
ICTY’s definition thereof (the ICTY Statute refers only to “persecutions on political, racial and
religious grounds”).161 The continuity of the principle in broader form into the Rome Statute suggests
that the ICTY’s jurisprudence, which was in many ways groundbreaking with respect to cultural
heritage, clearly had resonance as a normative concept.
Finally, the ICTY had proven more resilient than the 1954 Hague Resolution in part
because it offered a clear mechanism—that is, a dedicated legal body—through which to try war
criminals for specific crimes. The Rome Statute took this model and made it permanent in the form
of the ICC. It adopted the legal framework of ad hoc criminal tribunals like the ICTY and not only
enshrined it into a permanent body, but endowed it with more expansive subject-matter and
territorial jurisdiction. The Rome Statute thus established a means of effecting justice in the
universal public interest, for crimes of a global reach. Recognizing threats to cultural heritage
within this rubric affirms the issue as one of international concern, worthy of the same attention
afforded the most heinous international crimes, and prosecutable via the well-defined legal
framework embodied by the ICC.
Conclusion
With the Second Protocol and the Rome Statute, aspects of the innovative jurisprudence of the ICTY
found expression in treaty law. Both documents developed promising new frameworks for the
protection of cultural heritage. The remainder of this study will examine how these frameworks have
been exercised and what this practice suggests about the future of cultural-heritage protection.
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VI. Recent Cultural Crimes in Iraq, Mali, and Syria
Has cultural heritage been safer since passage of the Second Protocol and the Rome Statute? Despite
the improvements introduced by those two instruments, the ensuing twenty years have witnessed
persistent threats to and losses of cultural property from damage, destruction, and pillage. This
suggests that the Second Protocol and the Rome Statute have had a limited impact as preventative
measures, on a par in this respect with the UNESCO instruments that preceded them. There have,
however, been some gains with regard to prosecutions, as well as a notable wellspring of concern at
the international level for cultural heritage in peril, prompting the passage of relevant new resolutions
by both UNESCO and the Security Council. That threats to cultural heritage are now being
considered by the Security Council indicates that they are increasingly seen as a matter of
international peace and security, which augurs well for marshalling additional resources toward
combatting cultural crimes.
Such resources will be necessary, for the civil war in Syria, ongoing since 2011, “presents us
with the most widespread destruction of cultural heritage, both intentional and collateral, since the
Balkan Wars of the 1990s.”162 This devastation has been wrought in three key ways, the first being
combat between state and rebel forces. The second has been perpetrated by the so-called Islamic
State (ISIL), which has been waging a sustained campaign of violence in the territories over which
it lays false claim. Also threatening Syria’s culture are looters, who have capitalized on a lack of
oversight of museums and archeological sites to steal antiquities and sell them for personal profit or
to finance terrorist activities. As the conflict in Syria is ongoing, we can only speculate as to what
may be possible to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes, to restitute stolen properties, and to
ensure greater protections for cultural-heritage sites moving forward. In this respect, it is instructive
to look at Iraq and Mali, two countries that have also experienced significant cultural losses in recent
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years. How well has the system of cultural-heritage protection served these two countries, and what
successes and failures from these experiences can be brought to bear on Syria and beyond?
Cultural Destruction in Iraq
Damage, destruction, and loss of cultural heritage in Iraq has been significant and ongoing for nearly
thirty years, and has endured several discernible phases.163 The phase that got underway at the time
of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was marked by a particularly grievous failure to protect
culture, or to prosecute those responsible. Looters, exploiting the vacuum of governance precipitated
by the invasion of Baghdad, ransacked the National Museum of Iraq, absconding with an estimated
fifteen thousand antiquities, sculptural fragments, and art objects.164 The perpetrators included not
only organized criminal groups intending to traffic stolen property on the transnational black market,
but also average Iraqi citizens simply seizing on the opportunity to acquire something of value. The
lack of cataloguing of the museum’s collection—a deficiency that plagues cultural institutions
throughout the developing world, owing to a lack of funding, training, and staffing—meant that most
of what was stolen has disappeared without any hope of restitution.
Several jurists and scholars have argued that, in addition to the looters, the U.S. military is
complicit in this crime.165 They implicate the U.S. twice over: for creating the chaotic and lawless
conditions that left the museum vulnerable to pillage, and for failing to intervene or provide security
for the museum upon learning of the thefts, electing instead to secure nearby oilfields. The latter is
a violation of article 4(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention, which requires parties “to prohibit, prevent,
and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of
vandalism directed against, cultural property,” a provision further buttressed by the Second
Protocol.166 While it is true that the U.S. did not ratify the 1954 Hague Convention until 2009, and
was thus at the time not treaty-bound to uphold its tenets, legal scholar Wayne Sandholtz notes that,
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the United States’ leading role in promoting protections for cultural treasures in wartime, and its
consistent avowals of careful compliance with the requirements of the 1954 [Hague] Convention,
support the conclusion that the United States should have recognized a legal obligation to protect
the Iraqi National Museum.167

In other words, the U.S. was implicated by usus, and therefore compelled by customary law, to
uphold protections for cultural property in times of armed conflict. The assessment supports the
assertion that the 1954 Hague Convention has achieved customary legal status, which in theory
should bode well for the future of heritage protection, both in Iraq and elsewhere. After all, with the
heft of both treaty and customary law in its arsenal of legal protections, cultural heritage should be
assumed to enjoy broad and robust support at the international level.
The U.S. however, has rejected any suggestion that it was at fault in this incident,168 and it
has never been officially tried or sanctioned for its role in this crime—which begs the question of
whether the country’s hegemonic stature frees it to be selective in its exercise of certain principles
of jus in bello. (Its continued refusal to ratify the Rome Statute or to recognize the ICC instills further
concern that the U.S. may be skeptical of its international legal commitments.) As the conduct of
world powers generally sets the tone for the broader community of states, it is of grave concern that
the U.S. established such a dangerous precedent in Iraq. It suggests an inherent precarity in the
existing legal frameworks for cultural-heritage protection and implies a disregard for the principles
of heritage protection when the political will to uphold them is lacking. Such indifference can be
dangerous, not least for the signal it sends to would-be criminals. Indeed, the looting of Iraqi
archaeological sites continues to be an acute problem in the country, best exemplified by the
systematic pillage of the Mosul Museum by ISIL in 2015.169
As in Syria, ISIL began declaring control over parts of Iraq in 2013.170 Since then, in
addition to large-scale looting, the devastation of Iraqi cultural heritage has taken on a different
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tenor, one in which monuments are destroyed deliberately in acts of ideologically driven violence.
According to a 2016 report prepared for the UN Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights,
at least two globally significant [Iraqi] sites (the Assyrian capital cities of Nimrud and Nineveh)
have been subjected to serious episodes of destruction by Daesh [ISIL] during their occupation of
the Mosul region. . . . Additionally, multiple cultural sites of importance to ethnic and religious
groups of northern and western Iraq, including churches, shrines, mosques, minarets and tombs,
have been obliterated or severely damaged by Daesh [ISIL] in their attempt to eradicate the rich
cultural and religious diversity that has always characterized this region of the Middle East.171

The first major act of this nature to get the world’s attention had taken place in 2001, in Afghanistan,
where the Islamist Taliban deliberately destroyed a pair of monumental Buddha sculptures carved
into the cliffs at Bamiyan. The ancient Buddhas dated from before the introduction of Islam and were
thus declared sacrilegious by the fundamentalist Taliban. The group’s bombing of the sculptures was
not connected to a military campaign but, rather, to its desire to eradicate Afghanistan’s pre-Islamic
heritage. The Taliban declared as much in an edict issued before the explosions, which they
documented with photographs for propaganda purposes.172 The brazen and purposeful nature of the
assault prompted UNESCO to issue in 2003 the Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction
of Cultural Heritage (hereinafter, the 2003 UNESCO Declaration),173 which addresses attacks on
culture that are premeditated, standalone acts of malice rather than corollaries to military campaigns.
Such acts represent a kind of violence that exists outside the parameters of armed conflict as it has
been traditionally understood, and to which the accepted laws of war do not precisely apply.174 While
there have been no prosecutions to date of the many acts of this nature that have been perpetrated in
Iraq, some hope can be gleaned from a watershed case prosecuted by the ICC concerning the
deliberate destruction of culture in Timbuktu, Mali.
Cultural Destruction in Mali
In 2016, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, a Malian national, was convicted by the ICC of leading attacks
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against nine mausolea and one mosque in Timbuktu in 2012. The charges were pursuant to article
8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute, which, as previously discussed, includes under its definition of war
crimes the act of “intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education,
art, science or charitable purposes, [and] historic monuments.” Al Mahdi’s conviction followed a
guilty plea in which he confirmed that the charges brought against him were accurate and correct.175
He was sentenced to nine years in prison.
Al Mahdi carried out his crime in his capacity as an operative of Ansar Dine, the Islamist
group that had seized control of Timbuktu in April 2012. As leader of the hesbah, or morality
brigade, he worked with enforcers to ensure that citizens lived in strict accordance with Qur’anic law
and to inflict punishments on transgressors. The people of Timbuktu generally adhere to moderate
Islamic practices consistent with Sufism, a mystical branch of the faith.176 As Sufism recognizes the
existence of saints, it is dismissed as polytheistic, and therefore idolatrous, by Muslim
fundamentalists such as Ansar Dine.177 The religious buildings singled out for destruction were all
burial places of Sufi saints whose veneration the group deemed heretical.
Al Mahdi and his team carried out their task visibly and methodically with handheld tools,
underscoring the deliberately harmful nature of the act.178 Typifying the kind of conduct that had
inspired the 2003 UNESCO Declaration, Ansar Dine boldly publicized the attacks using traditional
and social media. They issued videos of the vandals at work and statements in defense of their
activities, none so damning as that made by a spokesman for the group when questioned about the
city’s status as a World Heritage site: “We are Muslims; what is UNESCO? . . . For us, their
indignation is an atonement.”179 The group’s intention to harm and to provoke outrage was
indisputable, larding the crime with a symbolic value that heightened its heinousness in the eyes
of the court.180 In a move reminiscent of the ICTY’s ruling on the destruction of the Old Town of
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Dubrovnik, the cultural significance of the targeted properties served as an aggravating factor in
Al Mahdi’s sentencing.181
We see in this case the expression of three factors examined in the preceding chapters as
being of critical use in the fight to protect cultural heritage. The first is the ascription of individual
criminal responsibility to Al Mahdi. Proving culpability is easier when it can be assigned to a
single person with an avowed criminal purpose, particularly if his violations (in this case, of
specific provisions of the Rome Statute) can be identified, itemized, and quantified.182 Second,
there is no doubt that this case was prosecuting the destruction of cultural property per se. The
targets were defined by their cultural value, and their destruction was sanctionable for precisely
the same reason. Third, the attacks were recognized by the ICC for their “discriminatory religious
motive”—that is, as measures taken against a group in an attempt to punish them for and prevent
them from practicing their religion—therefore qualifying as form of persecution.183 Linking the
crime to persecution heightened its gravity in the eyes of the court, serving as yet another
aggravating factor in Al Mahdi’s conviction and sentencing.184
It is significant to note that, because Al Mahdi’s crime was perpetrated in the absence of an
official military campaign, there could be no claim of military necessity as a justification for the
attack; indeed, none was put forth by the defense. This aspect of the Al Mahdi case underscores the
fact that threats to cultural heritage increasingly take the form of targeted expressions of extremism,
perpetrated by actors whose allegiance is not to a sovereign state but to one or more ideologies. Laura
Hammond points out that the performative value of targeting cherished landmarks has made it a
potent tactic of terrorism, for “It is the attention that the violence attracts . . . that gives it its power
and thus its effectiveness. . . . [W]hat makes the violent act meaningful is its symbolic character.”185
The value of cultural touchstones has long been recognized by belligerents seeking to control or
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coerce a group of people. It was not without reason that the Nazis torched Jewish temples on
Kristallnacht or that Serbian and Croatian nationalists targeted mosques in Bosniak communities as
a way of dismantling these groups’ identities. It is therefore not surprising that, as ambitious terrorist
networks seek to gain control over populations while signaling opposition to values or ideologies to
which they object, they would actively seek out cultural targets for their added symbolic resonance.
This approach has been readily apparent in Syria, where performative violence against heritage has
reached new, conscience-shocking heights.
Cultural Destruction in Syria
The Syrian Civil War, ongoing since 2011, has devastated large swathes of the country’s cultural
heritage, including all six of its UNESCO World Heritage sites.186 Both the scale and the nature of
the destruction has garnered significant international attention, owing in large part to the brutality
with which much of it is has been carried out. Of all the sites devastated during the conflict, the
razing of the ancient city of Palmyra has perhaps incited the most alarm, not least because it was
designated a World Heritage site in 1980 for the artistic and historical significance of its architectural
topography. The city’s Temple of Bel, built in the 1st century C.E. as a house of pagan worship, but
ultimately repurposed as a mosque, was deemed a heresy by ISIL, which occupied Palmyra at
various points between 2015 and 2017. The temple was one of the finest vestiges of Greco-Roman
architecture remaining in the Levant, thus representing a link to the Western culture and values that
ISIL openly disdained. The militants filmed their demolition of the temple for propaganda
purposes—but not before using the site as a venue for human executions. Among those killed was
Khaled al-Asa‘ad, the retired Director of Antiquities of the Palmyra Museum, who was beheaded
for refusing to assist the militants loot salable art objects from the museum.187 The savagery of this
“performance” elicited widespread revulsion and condemnation.
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Before ISIL carried out this act, the architecture of Palmyra had already sustained damage
during official combat operations between the Syrian state military and the rebel forces they
countered in the civil war. Indeed, by the time ISIL targeted the Temple of Bel, its façade had been
shelled and several of its columns toppled. Reports also suggest that belligerents on both sides of
the conflict had sheltered illegally amid the ruins.188 Together with the looting of the Palmyra
Museum—thefts of antiquities were mitigated but not completely halted by Khaled al-Asa‘ad’s
heroics—the city exemplifies the three key threats that plague cultural heritage today: damage
sustained corollary to armed conflict; large-scale performative violence; and looting and
trafficking of antiquities. How the international community of states responds to Syria, whether
by harnessing the legal frameworks explored in the preceding chapters or by instituting new
measures, will thus have resonance for years to come.
Possible Frameworks of Heritage Protection in Syria
With respect to the first threat—damage to cultural property during the course of official armed
conflict—there is room for both skepticism and hope. The original UNESCO system of heritage
protection was designed with traditional battlefields and forms of combat in mind, which could
ostensibly apply to the conflict in Syria. With respect to the example of Palmyra discussed above,
an offense such as sheltering amid cultural property is proscribed in article 4 of the 1954 Hague
Convention, while article 6 of the Second Protocol effectively bans the repurposing of cultural
property for any military use whatsoever. Syria, however, is party—and therefore beholden—to only
the 1954 Hague Convention, and the weakness of that treaty as an enforceable legal tool has by this
point been well elucidated.
At the same time, the ICTY’s successful conviction of many individuals for violations
against culture suggest that a criminal tribunal could be an effective forum for prosecuting heritage
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crimes in Syria. It has been suggested that a dedicated ad hoc tribunal to investigate war crimes in
Syria would be warranted, considering the length of the conflict and the breadth of the violence.189
An early draft statute for such a tribunal, a document known as the Chautauqua Blueprint, does
include basic provisions for crimes against cultural objects, though early assessments suggest that
these may be too limited and/or modest to be effective.190 Although the ICC demonstrated its own
commitment to cultural-heritage protection with its conviction of Al Mahdi, Syria is not party to the
Rome Statute and therefore outside the Court’s jurisdiction—unless it were to declare that it
“accept[s] the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question.”191 Whether
or not that were to happen, success in any criminal tribunal would be contingent on factors such as
securely identifying perpetrators so that individual criminal responsibility could be conferred, and
enumerating specific crimes deemed sanctionable by the existing legal instruments.
As for looting, there are some signs suggesting that perpetrators could be held to account. Of
the original three UNESCO treaties, UNESCO 1970, concerning the illicit import, export, and
transfer of ownership of cultural property, is comprehensive in its listing of sanctionable crimes and
uses indisputable language to deem these crimes unequivocally illicit.192 Moreover, while recourse
to extant domestic legal systems proved a weakness of the 1954 Hague Convention, the fact that
most states already have well established laws regarding the theft and transfer of property renders
similar provisions in UNESCO 1970 more readily enforceable by states equipped to do so.193 Syria,
in fact, has an exemplary antiquities law,194 with provisions for both movable and immovable
property and a highly punitive set of sanctions, all of which bode well for securing convictions for
art thefts committed during the war.195 The law is bolstered at the international level by such
resources as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, which has pinpointed the illicit trafficking of
cultural property as an “emerging crime” in its portfolio of priorities, and which, through its signature
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Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime—ratified by all but three UN member states—
has a robust mandate by which to tackle it.196
Perhaps most significantly, the Security Council has signaled its concern over the looting
and black-market sale of art and antiquities, specifically as it pertains to the funding of terrorism.
Indeed, it has been estimated that ISIL alone earns between $150 and $200 million a year from this
illicit trade.197 The Council made its first condemnation of the practice in Resolution 2199, passed
in 2015, which notes with concern that terrorist groups are “generating income from engaging
directly or indirectly in the looting and smuggling of cultural heritage items from archaeological
sites, museums, libraries, archives, and other sites,” and which calls on member states to take all
necessary steps to prevent these practices.198 Two years later, Resolution 2347 reaffirmed this
mandate while also recognizing the broader threat that the destruction of cultural property poses to
international peace and security,
Emphasizing that the unlawful destruction of cultural heritage, and the looting and smuggling of
cultural property in the event of armed conflicts, notably by terrorist groups, and the attempt to
deny historical roots and cultural diversity in this context can fuel and exacerbate conflict and
hamper post-conflict national reconciliation, thereby undermining the security, stability,
governance, social, economic and cultural development of affected States.199

Accordingly, Resolution 2347 pertains to the third and perhaps most troubling threat now facing
cultural heritage: intentional, performative violence. Crucially, the resolution notes “with grave
concern the involvement of non-state actors, notably terrorist groups, in the destruction of cultural
heritage and the trafficking in cultural property and related offences.”200 This acknowledgment of
NSAs has direct bearing on ISIL’s activity in Syria. ISIL is highly organized, mission driven, and
well funded, but it is not a sovereign state and therefore not party to any of the treaties and legal
instruments that hold international actors responsible for their actions. How, then, might those
responsible for the campaign of destruction in Syria be held accountable?
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Recognition by the Security Council is an important first step, for as it proved with its
imposition of sanctions on the self-declared (i.e., unrecognized) government of Southern Rhodesia
in the 1970s, “effective sovereignty over a territory is the only necessary requirement for imposing
sanctions on a government, irrespective of whether such government may technically be considered
a state under international law.”201 At the time of its destruction of Palmyra, the scope of ISIL’s
authority over the lands it claimed rendered it a de facto government, and thus eligible for sanction
under international law. The ICC’s conviction of Al Mahdi provides additional support for such an
approach, for while the accused was by birth a Malian national, he acted under the auspices of a third
party, Ansar Dine, which at the time of his crime was the de facto governing body in northern Mali.
As to which provisions of relevant conventions may be applicable to NSAs, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) asserts that treaty obligations extend to third parties under
two conditions: if the contracting parties to the treaty intended them to, and if the third party accepts
said obligations.202 Looking at the 1954 Hague Convention and its Second Protocol, article 19(1) of
the former binds “each party to the conflict” to its obligations. It has been argued that the use of a
lowercase “p” in party suggests that this statement extends to both states parties and third parties.203
As for the Second Protocol, which uses an uppercase “P” in the word Parties, according to JeanMarie Henckaerts, Legal Adviser to the International Committee of the Red Cross, who observed
the deliberations that resulted in the protocol’s drafting, “the understanding was that throughout the
text, the word ‘Party’ in the phrase ‘Party to the conflict’ includes rebel groups.”204 In further support
of this assertion, an official summary report of the Second Protocol notes that “the contracting parties
intended the Protocol to apply to all parties in a non-international conflict, whether state parties or
non-state parties.”205
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As for the second stipulation of the Vienna Convention, that NSAs must accept a treaty’s
obligations in order for it to apply, considering its avowed disdain for the international system, it is
highly likely that ISIL—despite its claims to sovereignty and the obligations such status entails—
would feel any onus to abide by the rules laid out in the 1954 Hague Convention, the Second
Protocol, or any other international treaty. At this point, it is important to return to a question
considered at various points throughout this study, as to whether protections for cultural heritage
have been suitably enshrined into customary law. Such a consideration is key, for according to some
jurists, customary international law is binding on NSAs, regardless of whether they have officially
acceded to their international legal obligations.206 It was noted earlier that, at the time of the drafting
of the ICTY Statute in 1993, the customary status of cultural-heritage law remained a matter of
debate. However, the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the passage of the Second Protocol, the activity of
the ICC in support of the Rome Statute, and, more recently, the adoption of the 2003 UNESCO
Declaration and Security Council Resolutions 2199 and 2347 provide convincing evidence that the
imperative to protect cultural heritage at the international level is now a widely accepted normative
principle, supported by both treaty and customary law. It is thus with a modest degree of optimism
that we can look beyond the war in Syria and hope that the conclusion of the conflict will include
some form of justice and restitution for the country’s immeasurable cultural losses.
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VII. Conclusion
In 1954, when UNESCO passed the first of three signature conventions to protect cultural heritage
in times of armed conflict, the horrors of World War II were still fresh in the international political
consciousness, and the idea that they might ever be repeated was unimaginable. Nevertheless, the
damage, destruction, and pillage of cultural property witnessed during that war have not only
persisted through the ensuing decades but redoubled. Indeed, it is clear that UNESCO’s original
framework of cultural-heritage protection proved insufficient on its own either to deter or to
prosecute cultural crimes. Deficiencies including a failure to precisely define sanctionable offences,
as well as fatal loopholes such as the one afforded to claims of “military necessity,” rendered these
well-intentioned legal instruments too broadly interpretable and too weakly enforceable. Crimes
against culture thus continued unabated and unpunished until well into the 1990s.
It was the through the workings of an ad hoc criminal tribunal, the ICTY, that certain key
liabilities in the UNESCO framework were superseded and its purpose finally borne out.
Intriguingly, the tribunal achieved as much without directly invoking the 1954 Hague Convention
or its corollary conventions of 1970 and 1972, suggesting that the principles these treaties espoused
had broad normative resonance, even if the mechanisms through which they were originally
intended to operate were flawed. These reverberations echoed beyond the ICTY, finding nearcontemporaneous expression in the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention and the Rome
Statute. Both represented critical steps forward in the effort to protect cultural heritage, the former
by directly addressing the weaknesses and lacunae of UNESCO’s signature convention, and the
latter by establishing a permanent forum and decisive legal framework through which cultural
crimes could be prosecuted.

53

Indeed, it is via the Rome Statute that the most prominent legal action to date against a
cultural-property crime was realized. The ICC’s prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi in 2016
sent a clear signal that the effacement of cultural heritage not only stands alone as a sanctionable
offence under international law, but also stands alongside the grievous crimes adjudicated by the
Court. Both the ICC’s success in convicting Al Mahdi and the achievements of the ICTY suggest
that criminal courts, whether ad hoc or permanent, offer the most effective frameworks for action
against cultural crimes. As demonstrated in the preceding pages, this efficacy can be ascribed in part
to the attention these legal instruments paid to principles that were inadequately addressed by the
UNESCO framework, namely, sufficient recourse to individual criminal responsibility; the question
of what constitutes “military necessity”; respect for cultural property per se; and linking the
destruction of cultural heritage to atrocity crimes.
Equally important is the impact these frameworks have had on bolstering the now widely
accepted normative consensus that cultural property is uniquely valuable and deserving of robust
protections. Such newfound resolve is evident, for example, in the passage of the 2003 UNESCO
Declaration and of Security Council Resolution 2347. Other factors beyond these improved legal
frameworks have no doubt also contributed to the entrenchment of this norm. For one, it is
undeniable that the nature of the attacks against culture is increasingly conscience-shocking, in some
cases irrevocably altering an existing built environment and/or impoverishing a state’s cultural
patrimony. That the heritage in question is often effaced intentionally further establishes these acts
as a moral affront, especially if perpetrated by NSAs whose avowed aim is to terrorize populations.
It may be that the sum total of these factors has raised the perceived threat level posed by these
destructive practices, and with it the impulse to respond. One might even draw parallels to the
consensus that developed around the responsibility to protect (R2P), a now deeply embedded norm
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that emerged in response to the failure to stop the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.207 That atrocity shocked
the international conscience into action, and one could argue that the high-profile nature of recent
attacks against culture, such as those at Palmyra, has had a similarly galvanizing effect toward
building normative consensus around the issue of protecting heritage.
Efforts to stop crimes against culture could benefit from the present international
environment that is increasingly intolerant of the destruction of heritage sites and monuments.
Reframing the issue in ways that further connect such acts of violence to atrocity crimes may thus
prove effective. As noted earlier, Thomas G. Weiss and Nina Connelly argue convincingly for
including heritage protection among the responsibilities inherent in the R2P rubric.208 Doing so
would harness the power of that norm’s existing, broad recognition and lend heritage protection an
added degree of legitimacy as an international priority. Similarly, Edward C. Luck’s compelling
argument for aligning the destruction of cultural heritage with genocide—an idea first broached by
Raphael Lemkin in the mid-1940s and which resurfaced among the recommendations presented in
the 1993 Report—warrants reconsideration today.209 Drawing parallels between efforts to eradicate
culture and those to eradicate populations would not only take full advantage of the legal instruments
used to combat genocide, but also heighten the sense of repugnancy that is increasingly attached to
crimes against culture, further galvanizing efforts to combat it.
As the so-called Global War on Terrorism continues to occupy a high priority for
international policymakers, emphasizing the ways in which the looting and trafficking of cultural
property can facilitate terrorism and the extent to which violence against culture has become a tactic
of NSAs may also bolster efforts to protect cultural heritage, ensuring that they form part of the
broader program to defeat global terrorism. Doing so would likewise recognize how the nature of
armed conflict, and of belligerents, is changing. It has been noted throughout this study that the 1954
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Hague Convention suffered from its circumscription by a model of warfare that has long been
obsolete. It is therefore incumbent on contemporary policymakers to recognize the dynamics of the
“new” wars and tailor the international response accordingly.
Finally, greater efforts should be made to work cross-sectionally with relevant
stakeholders from both within and outside the UN system. Despite sharing a common aim,
international policymakers work largely in parallel with museums and cultural NGOs in their
efforts to safeguard cultural heritage, rather than in collaboration. Alternatively, they enter into
bilateral partnerships, such as the Memorandum of Understanding signed by UNESCO and the
State Hermitage Museum mentioned at the start of this study, rather than pursue a more
coordinated approach across platforms. Max Hollein, Director of the Metropolitan Museum of
Art, New York, attributes this limited crossover in part to bureaucratic obstacles that make largescale collaboration difficult, and which encourage museums to instead pursue localized
programs of research, education, and the provision of resources to peer institutions in conflict
zones.210 While such efforts benefit from being more easily and quickly implemented, it seems
plausible that greater integration between policymakers and cultural institutions could only serve
to compound resources and allow actors from across the civil and political branches of this
movement to exercise their unique comparative advantage. The resulting policies would no
doubt be more informed, and ultimately more effective, in ending the destruction of cultural
heritage and redressing its harmful effects.
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